В Штатах вроде нельзя, но там это регулируется не законом, а специально разработанной ловушкой (кто отвечает выборочно, того притягивают за неуважение к суду). Повторяю: вроде бы, источник у меня малонадежный. dyak, это правда?
кто угодно может прекратить говорить в любой момент, отвечать выборочно и т. п.; если полиция этим недовольна, то человек либо имеет право встать и уйти домой, в офис лоера, в Гималаи, по выбору (если он не арестован), либо (если он арестован) потребовать лоера (причем лоера не приведут, а просто отведут его в камеру и оставят в покое до появления перед судьей).
Право на лоера в полиции имеется ТОЛЬКО у арестованного и ТОЛЬКО если этого арестованного допрашивают.
A defendant who chooses to take the stand waives the privilege and may be compelled to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). The Brown Court held that a defendant who elects to take the stand is subject to cross-examination about matters “made relevant by her direct examination.” Id. at 154. The defendant’s decision to testify amounts to a Fifth Amendment waiver, and “the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.” Id. at 154-55. Lesser remedies, such as striking the defendant’s testimony, also appear to be proper, in the court’s discretion. Id. at 156 n.5. However, the waiver is not limitless: it does not extend to collateral matters relevant only to credibility. For example, if a defendant on trial for assault were asked on cross-examination about an unrelated fraud he perpetrated – a specific instance of dishonest conduct about which a court may permit cross-examination under Rule 608(b) – he could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. As Rule 608(b) makes clear, “[t]he giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver o the privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.” Of course, whether a particular question is “made relevant by . . . direct examination” or “relate[s] only to credibility” may be a difficult issue in some instances, but the basic legal principles are fairly clear.
Under Brown, a non-party witness does not waive the privilege by testifying, at least if he or she is compelled to do so. (Whether a non-party witness who testifies without being subpoenaed waives his privilege by testifying is not clear from Brown.) Therefore, such a witness may not be compelled to provide incriminating answers on cross examination.
no subject
no subject
кто угодно может прекратить говорить в любой момент, отвечать выборочно и т. п.; если полиция этим недовольна, то человек либо имеет право встать и уйти домой, в офис лоера, в Гималаи, по выбору (если он не арестован), либо (если он арестован) потребовать лоера (причем лоера не приведут, а просто отведут его в камеру и оставят в покое до появления перед судьей).
Право на лоера в полиции имеется ТОЛЬКО у арестованного и ТОЛЬКО если этого арестованного допрашивают.
no subject
no subject
A defendant who chooses to take the stand waives the privilege and may be compelled to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). The Brown Court held that a defendant who elects to take the stand is subject to cross-examination about matters “made relevant by her direct examination.” Id. at 154. The defendant’s decision to testify amounts to a Fifth Amendment waiver, and “the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.” Id. at 154-55. Lesser remedies, such as striking the defendant’s testimony, also appear to be proper, in the court’s discretion. Id. at 156 n.5. However, the waiver is not limitless: it does not extend to collateral matters relevant only to credibility. For example, if a defendant on trial for assault were asked on cross-examination about an unrelated fraud he perpetrated – a specific instance of dishonest conduct about which a court may permit cross-examination under Rule 608(b) – he could assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. As Rule 608(b) makes clear, “[t]he giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver o the privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.” Of course, whether a particular question is “made relevant by . . . direct examination” or “relate[s] only to credibility” may be a difficult issue in some instances, but the basic legal principles are fairly clear.
Under Brown, a non-party witness does not waive the privilege by testifying, at least if he or she is compelled to do so. (Whether a non-party witness who testifies without being subpoenaed waives his privilege by testifying is not clear from Brown.) Therefore, such a witness may not be compelled to provide incriminating answers on cross examination.